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Human Rights Treaty Drafting through the Lens of Mental Disability:
the Proposed International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of
Persons with Disabilities

Aaron A. Dhir*

Draft Only

* LL.M. Candidate, New York University School of Law (2004); of the Ontario Bar; member of the Rehabilitation
International NGO delegation to the United Nations Working Group Meeting respecting the proposed International
Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, United Nations
Headquarters, New York (January 5 - 16, 2004). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Center for
Human Rights and Global Justice’s “Emerging Human Rights Scholarship Conference”, New York University
School of Law (October 31, 2003) where I benefited from the commentary of my colleagues. I owe particular thanks
to Philip Alston, Gerard Quinn and Mercedes Perez. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect
the position of Rehabilitation International.

1
These are the most devalued, disenfranchised people that you can imagine…[t]hey are so
out of sight, so out of mind, so devoid of rights, really. Who cares about them anyway?1
- Ron Honberg, Director of Legal Affairs for the National Alliance of the Mentally Ill

I.

Introduction

In December 2001, the Mexican government put forward Resolution 56/168 in the United
Nations (“UN”) General Assembly (“GA”).2 The resolution called for consideration of a Convention on
the human rights of persons with disabilities and further sought the immediate formation of an Ad-Hoc
Committee (“Committee”). This Committee would “consider proposals for a comprehensive and integral
international convention to protect and promote the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities”.3
Resolution 56/168 was passed without any vote. The Committee held its first session at UN Headquarters
in New York from July 29 to August 9, 2002. In its initial report to the UN GA, the Committee
recommended the adoption of a resolution that would, inter alia, invite “regional commissions and intergovernmental organisations, as well as nongovernmental organisations to make available to the Ad Hoc
Committee suggestions and possible elements, to be considered in proposals for a Convention”.4 The GA
subsequently passed Resolution 56/510, respecting the accreditation and participation of nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) in the Committee,5 and Decision 56/474, which “requests the

1

Eric M. Weiss, A Nationwide Pattern of Death, The Hartford Courant (Oct. 11, 1998), available at
http://www.copaa.com/newstand/day1.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2003).
2
Comprehensive and integral international convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with
disabilities, G.A. Res. 168, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 119(b), U.N. Doc A/RES/56/168 (2001).
3
Id. Resolution 56/168 followed on the heels of the first world NGO Summit on Disability in March 2000. The
resulting Beijing Declaration of Rights of People with Disability in the New Century strongly advocated for a
disability-specific convention “to promote and protect the rights of people with disabilities, and enhance equal
opportunities for participation in mainstream society”. See Article 6 of the BEIJING DECLARATION ON THE
RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN THE NEW CENTURY, adopted March 12, 2000 at the World
NGO Summit on Disability, available at http://www.unescap.org/decade/beijdeclarfin.htm (last visited Oct. 22,
2003).
4
REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON A COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES, at para. 16(7), U.N. Doc. A/57/357 (2002), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/adhoca57357e.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
5
Accreditation and participation of non-governmental organizations in the Ad Hoc Committee established to
consider proposals for a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to Promote and Protect the Rights
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Secretary-General to make, as needed and within existing resources, reasonable efforts to facilitate the
participation by persons with disabilities in the meetings and deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee…”6
The second session of the Committee took place again in New York from June 16 to 27, 2003 and
was marked by a significant increase in the participation of disability-related NGOs. Participating NGOs
formed a caucus, called the International Disability Convention Caucus (“IDCC”). The IDCC elected a
15-member steering committee, consisting of seven members from International Disability Alliance
(“IDA”) groups, five regional representatives, and one representative from each of the Center for
International Rehabilitation, the Landmine Survivors Network, and other non-disability related NGOs.
The session ended with a decision to form a 40 member Working Group, comprised of 27 representatives
from Member States, 12 NGO representatives and one representative from a National Human Rights
Institution.7 The Working Group met from January 5 to 16, 2004 for one session of ten working days to
prepare a first draft of a Convention for consideration at the third session of the Committee in May 2004.8
The GA’s decision to pursue a Disability Rights Convention has been enthusiastically welcomed
by the disability-related NGO community.9 Indeed, while the development of contemporary international
human rights law since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights has advanced the interests of a
number of marginalized, equality-seeking groups, it has simultaneously neglected the rights of persons

and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 56/510, U.N. GAOR, 109th plenary meeting, 56th Sess., Agenda
Items 8, 119(b), U.N. Doc A/RES/56/510 (2002).
6
Participation of persons with disabilities in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International
Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Decision
56/474, 56th session, Agenda items 8 and 119 (b), contained in A/56/49 Vol. III, (2002).
7
REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON A COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES, at para. 15(1), (2), U.N. Doc. A/58/118 & Corr.1 (2003), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/a_58_118_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
8
Id. at para. 15(4). The 12 NGO representatives on the Working Group include one representative from each of the
seven IDA organizations, and one representative from each of the five distinct geographic regions identified by the
IDCC members (Asia-Pacific, Africa, the Americas, West Africa and Europe).
9
While remaining mindful, of course, that the GA “has not yet endorsed the need for a human rights instrument…”
See Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J. Sundram, Recognizing Existing Rights and Crafting New Ones: Tools for Drafting
Human Rights Instruments for People with Mental Disabilities, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILTIES 467, 468 (Stanley S. Herr, Lawrence O. Gostin and Harold Hongju Koh, eds.,
2003).
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with disabilities. In particular, it has neglected those who are arguably the most vulnerable to powerful,
legalized coercion: persons diagnosed with mental disabilities.10
In this article, I explore whether, if established, such a Convention will in fact be an effective way
to limit abuses of the rights of those diagnosed with metal disabilities. This analysis is informed by
attempts to use international law to improve the rights of the mentally disabled. In Section II, I discuss
the failure of international human rights law to effectively address these abuses to date. In Section III, I
consider the debate surrounding the need for a disability-specific Convention. In Section IV, I argue that
in order for the proposed Convention to be effective, and not simply a hollow mechanism, it must reject
the traditional medical model of disability. Instead, the Convention should reflect a rights-based
paradigm premised on a reformulation of "disability" as a social construct. To conclude, I discuss some
of the principal issues facing the drafters relating to mental disability, including equality and nondiscrimination, the right to physical and psychological integrity and monitoring. Drawing on my
experience as a member of an NGO Delegation to the Working Group Meeting, I argue that NGO
submissions pertaining to mental disability failed in helping to shape the normative content of broad
statements of rights that are likely to be included in the final text of the proposed Convention. In an
attempt to fill this gap, I make particular recommendations that I hope will assist the proposed
Convention to realize its full potential.

II.

The Shortcomings of International Human Rights Law with respect to Mental Disability
International law has made significant advances in protecting the rights of racial minorities,11

10

As discussed by Rosenthal and Sundram, “many people are subject to discrimination based upon the improper
perception that they have a current or past mental disorder”. Thus, the term "mental disabilities" should be read
liberally, to encompass those diagnosed with a mental disability and those “perceived as such by medical authorities
or others.” See Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J. Sundram, International Human Rights In Mental Health Legislation,
21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 469, footnote 2 (2002).
11
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered
into force Jan. 4, 1969 [hereinafter CERD].
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women,12 children13 and migrant workers.14 In stark contrast, not only is there currently no international
treaty that specifically guarantees the rights of those with disabilities (mental or otherwise), but the desire
to codify such protections has been virtually non-existent. Attempts to address the issue of a Disability
Rights Convention in a meaningful way by Italy at the forty-second session of the GA in 1987,15 and
Sweden at the forty-fourth session in 1988,16 were both thwarted by the GA. This international
ambivalence towards the plight of mentally disabled persons is not surprising given a shameful history of
severe human rights abuses. Degrading living conditions, coerced “treatment”, scientific
experimentation, seclusion, restraints - the list of violations to the dignity and autonomy of those
diagnosed with mental disabilities is both long and egregious:
Human rights law and advocacy largely failed to offer any significant protection to the
mentally ill in the decades following the Second World War. Thus, there occurred:
(a) abusive medical experiments on mental patients in institutions;
(b) gross overcrowding and abuse of physical constraints in US mental hospitals in the
1950s and early 1960s;
(c) the abusive treatment of patients and denial of basic civil rights of patients in Japanese
private mental hospitals in the 1970s and 1980s;
(d) the long-term neglect and failure to provide adequate treatment in the colonies for
mentally ill and retarded on the Greek island of Leros;
(e) the widespread use of jails for the mentally ill in India…;
(f) neglect on a massive scale in the psychiatric institutions of the former Soviet bloc
(recent revelations about conditions in Hungary, Belarus, the Central Asian Republics as
well as the Russian Federation itself);
(g) the plight of the destitute and homeless mentally ill who have been `deinstitutionalised' in the United States and several western European countries.17
12

Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
46) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981 [hereinafter CEDAW].
13
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990.
14
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families,
G.A. res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), entered into force 1
July 2003 [hereinafter Migrant Workers Convention].
15
U.N. document A/C.3/42/SR.16.
16
U.N. document A/C.3/44/SR.16.
17
T.W. Harding, Human Rights Law in the Field of Mental Health: A Critical Review, 2000:101 ACTA
PSYCHIATR SCAND 24, 25 (2000). For discussions on the Soviet government’s manipulation of psychiatry to
serve state interests, see A. Young-Anawaty, International Human Rights Norms and Soviet Abuse of Psychiatry,
10:3 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. 785 (1978) and V. Rood, Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment: An International
Human Rights Issue, 9:3 CAL. W. INT’L. L. J. 629 (1979). For an examination of the historical and contemporary
role and purposes of forensic psychiatry in China, see Robin Munro, Judicial Psychiatry in China and its Political
Abuses, 14 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2000). For NGO discussions of rights violations in the mental health context,
see the various reports of Mental Disability Rights International, available at
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This is in no way suggests that international human rights instruments developed in the 20th
century have no bearing on the rights of those diagnosed with mental disabilities. On the contrary,
existing Convention-based rights, most notably under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”)18 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”)19 have the potential to become important tools in disability rights advocacy, particularly with
respect to drafting and interpreting domestic mental health legislation.20 These obligations are especially
important given that there is no guarantee that the UN will actually adopt an effective Disability Rights
Convention, or any Convention at all. Further, there is no guarantee that governments would ratify such a
Convention.21 However, in practice, these instruments have few provisions that relate directly to mental

http://www.mdri.org/publications/index.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2003), including: NOT ON THE AGENDA:
HUMAN RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES IN KOSOVO (2002); HUMAN RIGHTS &
MENTAL HEALTH: MEXICO (2000); CHILDREN IN RUSSIA'S INSTITUTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM (1999); HUMAN RIGHTS & MENTAL HEALTH: HUNGARY (1997); and
HUMAN RIGHTS & MENTAL HEALTH: URUGUAY (1995). See also the reports of the Mental Disability
Advocacy Center, available at http://www.mdac.info/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2003), including CAGE BEDS:
INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT IN FOUR EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES (2003) (a report on the
use of cage beds in psychiatric facilities in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia); WRITTEN
COMMENTS OF THE MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY CENTER CONCERNING ESTONIA FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE AT ITS 77TH SESSION
(2003); and WRITTEN COMMENTS OF THE MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY CENTER CONCERNING
THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE AT ITS 78TH SESSION (2003). Last, see Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 10, at 472 – 473:
People with mental disabilities are often deprived of liberty for prolonged periods of time without
legal process; subjected to peonage and forced labor in institutions; subjected to neglect in harsh
institutional environments and deprived of basic health care; victimized by physical abuse and
sexual exploitation; and exposed to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
18

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
19
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.
20
The most relevant of these Convention-based rights include: the right to the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health; protections against discrimination; protections against torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment; and protections against arbitrary detention.
21
Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 10, at 470–471. While the issue of the application of existing international
human rights instruments to those diagnosed with mental disabilities is beyond the scope of this article, see
Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 10 for the most comprehensive discussion available. For specific discussion on
the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights to mental health law, see Lawrence O. Gostin,
Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities: The European Convention of Human Rights, 23 INT’L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 125 (2000); Gerard Quinn, Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1992); and T.W. Harding, The Application of the
European Convention of Human Rights to the Field of Psychiatry, 9(4) MED. LAW. 1078 (1990).
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disability and “[h]uman rights oversight bodies that monitor the mainstream conventions and establish
reporting guidelines have dedicated little attention to the rights of people with mental disabilities.”22
In the 1970s, the UN put forth its first instruments specifically addressing the rights of people
with disabilities. However, both the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons23 and the
Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons24 reflected a “notion of disability that falls within the
medical model, according to which disabled persons are primarily seen as individuals with medical
problems, dependent on social security and welfare, and in need of segregated services and institutions.”25
The late 1980s and early 1990s were characterized by further movement in the field of mental disability
rights. In 1986, the Special Rapporteur appointed by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities authored a report titled “Principles, Guidelines and
Guarantees for the Protection of Persons Detained on Grounds of Mental Ill-Health or Suffering from
Mental Disorder.” Soon after, the Vienna 1993 World Conference on Human Rights “reemphasized the
fact that people with mental and physical disabilities are protected by international human rights law”.26
As a result of the recommendations of the Vienna Conference, the GA adopted a historic resolution in the
1993 "Standard Rules on Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities" ("Standard Rules").
Though the Standard Rules are not part of a Convention, and thus lack “hard law” status, they were “a
revolutionary new international instrument because they establish[ed] citizen participation by people with
disabilities as an internationally recognized human right.”27 Indeed, under the Standard Rules,

22

Rosenthal and Sundram, id., at 474. It can also be argued that traditionally disability rights groups have not
exhausted the existing routes: “[t]hese groups have filed few complaints with UN oversight bodies and have rarely
submitted ‘shadow reports’ that can provide the UN bodies the facts needed to find governments in violation of
international human rights law.” See Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 9, at 477. This certainly raises the
question of how much of the responsibility should be assigned to advocates and how much should be laid on the
treaty system and oversight mechanisms themselves.
23
G.A. Res. 2856 (XXVI), 26 U.N. GAOR Supp., at 93, U.N. Doc A/8429 (1971).
24
G.A. Res. 3447 (XXX), para.4, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 34 at 88, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
25
Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey Of International, Comparative And Regional Disability Law Reform,
(paper presented at "From Principle to Practice: An International Disability Law and Policy Symposium"), available
at http://www.dredf.org/symposium/degener1.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). A detailed discussion of the medical
model, contrasted with the social model, is contained in part IV of this article.
26
Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 10, at 475.
27
Id. at 476.
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governments were “required to remove obstacles to equal participation and actively to involve disability
NGOs as partners in this process.”28
Most directly pertaining to the issue of mental disability, in 1991 the GA adopted the "Principles
for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care" ("MI
Principles").29 While the MI Principles are often referred to as the “‘centrepiece'" of international human
rights law in the field of mental health”,30 they have been severely criticized for promoting a paternalistic
medical-model perspective rather than a rights-based perspective, and for being weak on the right to
refuse harmful neuroleptic antipsychotic treatment. For example, Gendreau, of the Universite de
Montreal, has argued that Principle 11 “…gives an eloquent illustration of the medical orientation now
formally recognized by the General Assembly of the United Nations.”31 While Principle 11(4) grants
patients the right, subject to certain limitations, “to refuse or stop treatment”, it also requires that “[th]e
consequences of refusing or stopping treatment must be explained to the patient.” While upon initial
glance this provision may appear benign, Gendreau’s more nuanced reading reveals the subtle influence
of the medical model perspective:
Why is this kind of information only required when a person refuses or wants to stop a
treatment? On the contrary, it should be part of the right to information included in the
definition of informed consent. This provision shows an obvious tendency to presume
that the refusal of treatment always and exclusively has negative effects and that the
acceptance of treatment always and exclusively has positive effects. It implies that
everything must be done to make those who refuse treatment change their mind, whether
or not they are competent, by stressing the consequences of the negative choice being
made. In such circumstances, one may well doubt that a free decision was made by the
patient and that an informed consent was validly obtained.32
28

Gerard Quinn and Theresia Degener, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY: THE CURRENT USE AND
FUTURE POTENTIAL OF UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF
DISABILITY 35 (February 2002).
29
Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A.
Res. 46/119, 46 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, Annex at 188-192, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991). For a discussion of
using MI Principles as a tool in interpreting relevant sections in human rights conventions, see Eric Rosenthal &
Leonard S. Rubenstein, International Human Rights Advocacy under the "Principles for the Protection of Persons
with Mental Illness," 16 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 257 (1993).
30
Harding, supra note 17, at 24.
31
Caroline Gendreau, The Rights of Psychiatric Patients in the Light of the Principles Announced by the United
Nations: A Recognition of the Right to Consent to Treatment?, 20:2 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 259, 270 (1997).
32
Id. at 272. Gendreau concludes her analysis with the following condemnation of the MI Principles:
…far from recognizing the lay character of the decision to accept or to refuse a treatment, these
Principles consecrate a particular medical approach to human rights. In fact, the right to treatment
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Further, the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry (“WNUSP”) has questioned the
credibility of the MI Principles, given that they “…were developed without significant involvement by
psychiatric users and survivors.”33

III.

The Debate regarding a Disability-Specific Convention
The present lack of a Disability Rights Convention can arguably be attributed more to disinterest

than concrete objections.34 Other than the potential counter-productive repetition of existing mechanisms,

predominates with health as a strong symbolic underlying value. This health value, I must
underline, is exclusively reduced to a medical perspective and it implies, for the psychiatric
patient, the obligation to be treated without due consideration of his or her capacity to consent to
treatment. This means that the U.N. Principles effectively confer a supreme right of intervention
upon medical authorities pursuing "the improvement of mental health care." They impose a
dichotomous conception of the protection of the person's rights and freedoms in which the right to
treatment is set in opposition to the other human rights, without sufficient regard to a patient's own
representation of health. Such a perspective is obviously in concordance with the discourse
founded on health held by well-represented participants to the drafting process of the U.N.
Principles. This is also in clear opposition with the other discourse founded on autonomy and
equality held by a minority of participants.
Id. at 276.
33
WORLD NETWORK OF USERS AND SURVIVORS OF PSYCHIATRY PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ON
THE UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS TO
THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2000), available at http://www.wnusp.org/docs/nyreport.html
(last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
34
The U.S. has expressed support for a Disability Rights Convention, but has stated that it will not become a party
given its “comprehensive domestic laws protecting those with disabilities”. See STATEMENT BY RALPH F.
BOYD, UNITED STATES ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TO THE UN GENERAL
ASSEMBLY AD HOC COMMITTEE (June 18, 2003), available at http://www.aapd.com/docs/missionun.html
(last visited Oct. 18, 2003). In response, the U.S. International Council on Disabilities issued the following
indictment of the U.S. government’s position:
…we nonetheless believe the official U.S. Government position ignores the fundamental need for
a United Nations Convention. Essentially, the U.S. has taken the position that a Convention is not
necessary for the United States because we have excellent disability law, and that it is the
responsibility of each country to develop its own laws also. Therefore, it will neither support nor
oppose a Convention, but will offer "technical assistance" to the Ad Hoc Committee as requested.
While we certainly appreciate the sovereign right and necessity of each country to develop their
own laws, the U.S. position misses the point on several levels:
The role of [an] international Convention is never intended to supercede superior domestic laws,
nor is it to replace the need for development of domestic law. Rather, a Convention provides a
statement of universal human rights principles that underpin and reinforce domestic law where it
exists, and provide minimum standards for what any domestic law - existing or new - should
contain.
The notion that Americans with disabilities - and, indeed, US disability law - would not be served
by such a Convention, implies that the international human rights framework is not relevant to the
United States and furthermore undermines the global importance of international human rights

9
which will be discussed below with respect to the issue of treaty monitoring, perhaps the most credible
objection to the proposed Convention is that it will have the effect of further dramatizing differences
between individuals with disabilities, and thus will be stigmatizing in and of itself. This “dilemma of
difference”35 reflects the concern that by addressing difference in an individual instrument, policy-makers
may reinforce and perpetuate marginalization. On the other hand, if difference is not addressed in an
individual instrument, marginalization/stereotypes may be avoided, though the risk is that difference is
ignored.
This argument, however, is insufficient to thwart a potential Convention. Rather than
perpetuating marginalization, a disability-specific Convention affords the international community the
opportunity to acknowledge difference and bring it into the mainstream. This is especially important vis a
vis mental disability, which carries with it a stigma that is arguably more entrenched than other forms of
disability-related stigma. Further, this fear did not prevent the adoption of other thematic conventions. In
other words, there is no reason to think that this marginalization would occur with respect to those with
mental disabilities when no evidence can be found of its existence with respect to racial minorities,
children and women.36
Instead, the reasons supporting a disability-specific Convention are many. As previously
discussed, international human rights instruments and treaty monitoring bodies have all but ignored the

law. It is arrogant and disingenuous of the US (1) to declare that it has experience and expertise in
such laws and (2) to offer technical assistance for a Convention that it has already declared as
unnecessary.
The U.S. disability community believes that the government is missing the opportunity to draw
upon its national experience and contribute in a meaningful way to a critical international policy
process to which the disability community - both in the US and abroad - has attached great
importance.
RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITIES (USICD) TO THE
STATEMENT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION AS DELIVERED BY THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (June 18, 2003), available at http://www.aapd.com/docs/generalcivilrights.html
(last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
35
As described by scholar Martha Minow. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990).
36
Quinn and Degener, supra note 28 at 297.
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issues confronting those with disabilities.37 A thematic Convention is the strongest way to ensure that
those with disabilities remain “visible”.38 With this visibility comes the articulation of specified rights
and the mechanisms necessary for ensuring compliance (in other words, a primary, centralized body to
monitor compliance, coupled with a detailed reporting mechanism). Further, it has been argued that the
very process of treaty-making can result in key benefits, such as heightening public awareness of rights,
bringing to the surface ignored rights violations, developing NGO and government knowledge-bases
(which can evolve into law and policy reform and public-education initiatives), coalition building
between disability organizations (and between these organizations and non disability-related civil society
actors), catalyzing programmatic developments and facilitating the cost-effective collection of data.39
Last, the absence of a binding disability-specific Convention means that there will continue to be minimal
consideration given to the correlation between disability and poverty. As stated by World Bank President
James D. Wolfensohn, “[f]our hundred million disabled people live in the world's developing countries.
All too often their lives go hand in hand with poverty, isolation and despair.”40 Wolfensohn goes on to
note that “[m]ore than 1.3 billion people worldwide struggle to exist on less than $1 a day, and the
disabled in their countries live at the bottom of the pile.”41

IV.
The Social Model of Disability vs. The Medical Model: The Move to a Rights-Based
Paradigm
The draft and eventual final text of the proposed Convention will be the end result of negotiating
the tensions between two opposed theoretical models. Disability has traditionally been defined according
to the “medical model” which continues to be the dominant model of healthcare in countries such as the

37

"[I]nternational human rights forums have been generally unresponsive to the situation and specific needs of
persons with disabilities." See Philip Alston, Disability and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: The Legal Framework, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLED PERSONS: ESSAYS AND
RELEVANT HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 94 (Theresia Degener and Yolan Koster-Dreese, eds., 1995).
38
Quinn and Degener, supra note 28 at 297.
39
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (June 12, 2002), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/unwhitepaper_05-23-02.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
40
James D. Wolfensohn, Poor Disabled and Shut Out, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 3, 2002, A25, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/B-SPAN/docs/wolfensohn_op_ed_120302.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
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U.S. This model construes disability as “…an observable, mental, sensory or psychological deviation
from normality caused by disease, trauma or another health condition.”42 Under the medical model, the
functional limitations arising from these conditions can sometimes be prevented or managed by medical
treatment.43 In that regard, the individual is considered problematized and thus is “an object for clinical
intervention.”44 This model can be contrasted with the social model, which advocates for an
understanding of disability as a social construct:
Perceiving disability as a condition similar to illness and exclusively as a functional
limitation means that disability is considered as an individual rather than a societal
problem, and that solutions are searched in the individual sphere…Thus, neither the
society nor the environment have to be changed…The disability movement rejects this
medical approach because of the subjectivity of the defining process and the power
relations in which it takes place. What is regarded as a disability depends to a great
extent on individual, societal, cultural and medical perceptions of what is “normal” and
this in turn depends very much on the point of comparison.45
Applying this paradigm to mental health specifically, clinical psychologist A. Galves has
argued as follows:
The conception of human beings that is reflected by mainstream psychiatry is overly
narrow and reductionistic. It portrays human beings as a mass of random chemical and
physical dynamics at worst and weak, dependent, irrational victims at best. Psychiatry
has lost track of the most important and valuable parts of human beings: their drives,
instincts, emotions and wills. Without an accurate conception of the organism they are
treating, it is impossible for psychiatrists to provide effective treatment.46
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eds., 2002).
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Quinn and Degener, supra note 28, at 14. For further elaboration on traditional disability models, see Gareth
Williams, Theorizing Disability, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 123 (Gary L. Albrecht, Katherine D.
Seelman & Michael Bury eds., 2001).
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Theresia Degener, Disabled Persons and Human Rights: The Legal Framework, in Degener and Koster-Dreese,
supra note 36, at 13. See also H. Hahn, Towards a Politics of Disability: Definitions, Disciples, and Policies, 22:4
SOC. SCI. J. 87 (1985); and P. Abberly, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of
Disability, 2:1 DISABILITY, HANDICAP & SOC’Y 5 (1987).
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OF PSYCHIATRISTS, available at: http://www.mindfreedom.org/mindfreedom/m18_main.shtml (last visited Oct.
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the Center for Studies of Schizophrenia at the National Institute of Mental Health in Washington, D.C.) states: “No
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Mosher to Dr. Rodrigo Munoz, then President of the American Psychiatric Association (Dec. 4, 1998), available at
http://hem.fyristorg.com/mosher/resig.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
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Though some commentators have suggested that “[o]ver time, this medical model of disability is
being replaced”,47 it is abundantly clear that with respect to mental disability, the prevailing model is still
the medical-model. Indeed, it is not only the medical community that has resisted understanding mental
illness as a social construct: “[t]he disability movement has also, at times, been reluctant to include
people with mental health problems. The fear of mental illness which stalks society at large is shared by
many who otherwise are active in challenging social exclusion and who argue, in other contexts, that
disability resides in the attitudes of society rather than in physical or mental variations from the norm.”48
I would caution that we must remain vigilant of the medical-model’s intrusion into the Convention
drafting process. If past international human rights instruments, such as the MI Principles, are any
indicator, there is certainly reason for concern.49 The strongest assertion of this model thus far in the
drafting process has come from the Pan American Health Organization (“PAHO”), which serves as the
World Health Organization’s (“WHO”) Regional Office for the Americas and as the health organization
of the Inter-American System. PAHO’s submission to the Committee is retrogressive and unhelpful to
the development of a strong Convention calling as it does for the incorporation of the MI Principles,
“especially with regard to consent to treatment…”50

47
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Kate Harrison, Disability and Mental Health Law, in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISABILITY 193 (Jeremy Cooper,
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PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION (MENTAL HEALTH AND SPECIALIZED PROGRAMS
UNIT), CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROPOSAL FOR A CONVENTION ON PROTECTION AND PROMOTION
OF THE RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/uncontrib-paho.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) [emphasis added].
In general there has been a strong medical-model voice in international bodies’ attempts to address mental health
issues. For example, the WHO is presently developing a “Manual on Mental Health Legislation” (“Manual”). The
purpose of the Manual is to bring “…together information on international norms and standards in the area of mental
health and human rights, as well as best practice information on mental health law in countries, in order to inform
and assist countries wishing to formulate and implement legislation.” See WHO MENTAL HEALTH AND
HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, available at http://www.who.int/mental_health/media/en/606.pdf (last visited Oct.
19, 2003). The draft Manual, which is arguably at least somewhat reflective of a rights-based perspective, was
circulated for discussion amongst stakeholders and received the following comments from a noted Professor of Law
and Psychiatry at Harvard University:
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The argument in favour of a rights-based approach focusing on individual dignity, rather than a
medical-based approaching focusing on treatment, is not simply related to concerns about the efficacy and
repercussions of the actual treatment. It also relates to the methodology that results in the prescription of
treatment. As discussed above, the social construct theory holds that despite the assertions of those
supporting the medical-model paradigm, what is labeled as disability “is not generally selected through a
neutral or disinterested process” but rather “through an apparatus of power”.51 The connection between
the biases of mental health practitioners and psychiatric diagnoses is quite illustrative of this concern:
The fact that physicians consider treatment and cure to be their first priority should,
however, be recognized as a powerful value system that will inevitably skew professional
judgment. For example, a physician's doubts about a patient's competence to accept or
refuse treatment are typically resolved in the patient's favor if the patient wishes to accept
treatment; the patient's competence is challenged only if she refuses treatment. In
addition, medical professionals readily sacrifice patient autonomy to protect patients from
harm or to reduce risks to their health.
…
Members of a given profession also tend to share a professional consensus on many
issues -- particularly regarding diagnoses and treatments -- for which there is actually
little or conflicting empirical support. For example, mental health professionals rely
heavily on interviews for diagnosis even though studies show that interviews are not

…it seems rather to be the work of lawyers who have been trapped in a time warp since the 1970s.
This draft of the manual would impose on the rest of the world the complex array of legal
restrictions and red tape that antipsychiatry ideologues imposed on American psychiatry back in
that era.
…
…the draft's experts have the same basic goal as the antipsychiatry legal advocates of the 1970s.
Every psychiatric intervention is to be contested on legal grounds. One can find lots of verbiage
in the draft about the importance of families, about the plague of mental illness and about the need
for treatment. But the actual provisions come straight from the most radical rights-driven models
of the 1970s. The underlying rationale in the 1970s was skepticism about the reality of mental
disorders and the efficacy and risks of psychotropic drugs. Thirty years later, this skepticism, often
based on ignorance and bias, cannot be justified.
Alan A. Stone, M.D, Commentary: On Formulating Mental Health Codes for the World, (July 2002),
available at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/p020701c.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2003). The premise that
the Manual is reflective of a rights-based paradigm is hotly contested. Mental disability rights NGOs have
issued equally scathing critiques of the draft Manual, but for the opposite reason, arguing that it “obscures
and justifies human rights violations such as forced interventions and incarceration by labelling them as
treatment.” See COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT WHO MANUAL ON MENTAL HEALTH
LEGISLATION (July 12, 2001), available at http://www.wnusp.org/docs/dr_m_funk.html (last visited Oct.
19, 2003).
51
Quinn and Degener, supra note 28, at 15. Reliance on allegedly “objective” medical research and assessments is
key to the medical-model paradigm and vigorously defended by its supporters. As stated by Dr. Alan A. Stone,
Touroff-Glueck Professor of Law and Psychiatry in the faculties of law and medicine at Harvard University,
“Lawyers may have a different perspective, but physicians usually look to the available empirical evidence and
insist on proof that a method works.” See Stone, id.
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particularly likely to yield valid results; many standard tests relied upon by mental health
professionals are similarly deficient. Worse, studies show that professionals have great
confidence in their own judgments and are highly resistant to changing them, even when
these judgments are based on invalid tools of diagnosis. Evidence suggests that some
professional judgments in the mental health field are made within minutes of meeting the
client.
…
Treatment for health problems, especially mental health problems, requires an
understanding of the patient's culture and personal history. Researchers have observed
that "as the sociocultural distance between the clinician and his patient increases,
diagnoses become less accurate." This problem is particularly intense in the public sector
where the involuntary "clients," unlike their caretakers, are disproportionately members
of racial minorities and are indigent. In state and county hospitals, black men are
hospitalized at a rate 2.8 times greater than white men, and black women at a rate 2.5
times greater than white women. By contrast, only about 2% of psychiatrists are black.
Out of 273,600 licensed psychologists in this country in 1986, only 10,000 were black.
Ninety percent of the 3,209 doctorates in psychology in 1989 were awarded to whites.
Studies on diagnosis and treatment confirm what these statistics suggest: members of
minorities are misdiagnosed far more often than white patients. The misdiagnosis usually
takes the form of overdiagnosing schizophrenia in black patients; blacks are diagnosed
with schizophrenia at almost twice the rate of white inpatients. Because schizophrenia is
generally considered one of the most serious mental disorders, misdiagnosis may be one
explanation for the fact that minorities are involuntarily committed to state institutions at
a statistically disproportionate rate. Once there, black men are far more likely to be
subject to seclusion than white men.52

If we accept a social construct theory of disability, the logical progression is a move to a rightsbased paradigm that focuses on the dignity of the individual and the responsibility of the State “…to
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Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional
Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 657 - 660 (1992) (footnotes omitted). T.W. Harding, of the Institute of
Forensic Medicine, University of Geneva, has attributed failings in psychiatry partially to the context in which it
originated:
It is important to recall several facts about the origins of psychiatry:
(a) it was closely linked with legal and forensic medicine, and therefore associated with the
judicial system and social control;
(b) it developed largely outside academic centers of medicine; indeed, when the first chairs of
psychological medicine were established in Berlin (Prof. Griesinger) and Edinburgh (Prof.
Robertson), the basis of institutional psychiatry began to be
questioned;
(c) it adopted enthusiastically theories of criminal anthropology, in particular the concepts
of degeneration and atavism, which underpin the concepts of innate dangerousness and
untreatability.
Even modern, ‘scientific’ psychiatry has problems of ridding itself of the consequence of these
dubious origins, which are still reflected in existing legal provisions.
See Harding, supra note 17, at 25.
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tackle socially created obstacles in order to ensure full respect for the dignity and equal rights of all
persons.”53 Such a rights-based approach is an essential step forward in disability advocacy and must
inform the drafting of the proposed Convention for it to be effective. This approach empowers persons
with disabilities to transform what have traditionally been viewed as needs into claimable rights: “[i]n
reorienting the focus from needs to rights, people with disabilities may be recognized as active rightsbearing individuals who are participants in their own development and who should be consulted
accordingly in development decision-making.”54
V.

Recommendations in Drafting the Proposed Disability Rights Convention
While a Disability Rights Convention is needed and would be a move towards recognizing and

protecting the rights of those with disabilities, “there is also a need for the drafters of any new disability
rights instruments to proceed with caution.”55 In particular, Rosenthal and Sundram have cautioned that
in formulating a new instrument, regard must be had to existing instruments in order to avoid mistakes
that have thwarted past attempts at codifying disability rights.56 Indeed, while it might appear selfevident upon initial consideration, there is great peril in drafting a new instrument that provides fewer
protections than existing instruments.57
It is also necessary to remain mindful of the relationship between the ideal and the real. States
and stakeholders advocating for the inclusion of particular protections and principles must consider how
far ahead a human rights treaty can progress beyond what the international community is prepared to
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Quinn and Degener, supra note 28, at 14. Indeed, the disability rights movement has been referred to as the “next
generation” civil rights movement. Id. at 15.
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NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 38. As stated by Quinn and Degener, id. at 296:
The need for a holistic approach to disability is consonant with the postulate that civil and political
rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights, on the other, are interdependent
and interrelated… This is not the freedom of welfare, which places people with disabilities in
gilded cages and locks them into cycles of dependency and despondency. It is economic, social
and cultural justice, which liberates people with disabilities so that they can play their part in – and
contribute their share to – inclusive societies.
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Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 9, at 470.
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accept. For example, the Migrant Workers Convention was essentially the result of states that regularly
receive migrant workers capitulating to the demands of states from where migrant workers often originate
(e.g. Mexico, the Philippines). It was, in fact, in the interests of the “receiving countries” to be nonresponsive. Thus, though it came into force on July 1, 2003, no receiving countries have ratified it. At
worst, the Convention can be seen as a sort of “ghost treaty” that will never have any real meaning. With
this principle in mind, while disability-related NGOs admirably represented the perspectives of persons
with disabilities at the Working Group Meeting, in general they did not come prepared to engage with
states on legal issues. Rather, particular submissions (e.g. that the proposed Convention should have
direct application to private parties and should create rights not previously recognized in international
human rights law, rather than acknowledging that existing rights are applicable to persons with
disabilities and focusing on how to implement them) served only to undermine NGO credibility and to
unnecessarily raise the backs of states.58

Progressive Realization
The issue of whether governments would be obligated to take immediate action to effect the
provisions of the proposed Convention relating to economic and social rights is fundamental. The
ICESCR provides that governments “undertake to take steps…with a view to achieving progressively the
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant”.59 While Rosenthal and Sundram point
to the “extensive body of jurisprudence and comment” interpreting the progressive realization
requirement as involving some level of immediate obligation, it should be noted that such commentary
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See also WNUSP’s suggestion that the Convention should include a sort of paramountcy clause, where other
international instruments that are “in contravention with or derogation of the provisions of this convention [are]
deemed void ab initio.” SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS AD HOC COMMITTEE ON A
COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT
THE RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (2003), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/contrib-wnusp.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003) [hereinafter WNUSP
SUBMISSION].
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ICESCR, supra note 19, Art. 2(1).
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essentially stems from the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ General Comment No. 3,
which represents the Committee’s interpretation of the ICESCR.60 However authoritative, General
Comments are not binding in law.61 I suggest that a more favorable approach would be to include a
provision imposing immediate obligations where those obligations are within the state party's means:
In relation to the economic, social and cultural rights set forth in [Part III of] this
Convention, States Parties undertake to give immediate effect to those aspects of those
rights which are capable of immediate implementation (including, but not limited to
obligations of non-discrimination in the enjoyment of those rights) and in relation to
other aspects of those rights, to take steps to the maximum of their available resources
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of those rights by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.62

Definition of Disability
As recognized by participants in the June 2003 Asian and Pacific regional expert group meeting
held in Bangkok, there is a range of potential definitions of "disability" should the Committee elect to
include a definition. Thus, in keeping with the social model of disability advocated by this article, it is
essential that any “definition of disability should not be restrictive. For example it should cover physical,
sensory, intellectual, psychiatric and multiple disabilities. It should acknowledge that disability can be
permanent, temporary, episodic and perceived…[i]t has a range of implications for social identity and

60

Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc.E/1991/23
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in the Working Group Draft submitted to the Committee. See DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE RIGHTS AND
DIGNITY OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, CRP.4, plus CRP.4/Add.1, Add.2, Add.4 and Add.5, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcwgreportax1.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Working
Group Draft].

18
behaviour, and largely depends upon context.”63 National Human Rights Institutions (“NHRIs”) from
across Africa (including those from Kenya, Niger, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania,
Uganda and Zambia) met in Munyonyo-Kampala, Uganda in June 2003 to discuss the proposed
Convention. The NHRIs have appropriately recommended that any definition of discrimination must
“recognise the impact of dual or multiple discrimination faced by individuals such as women, children,
refugees, minorities or persons with multiple disabilities or other status.”64 With respect to those
suffering from mental disability, perhaps the most important consideration besides inclusiveness is that
any definition “…is comfortable both for people with disabilities who identify with medical terminology
and diagnosis, and for those who reject medical terminology and identify with disability as a social and
political category only.”65

Equality and non-discrimination
Certain delegations to the Working Group preferred a treaty based on non-discrimination rather
than one that adopts a comprehensive approach. For example, the European Union’s (EU) draft
submission to the Working Group emphasizes issues of discrimination and equality of opportunity.66
This was not, however, the preference of the majority of participants. Whichever way the Committee
decides, undoubtedly the issue of discrimination is pertinent for those with any sort of disability and is
particularly resonant for persons diagnosed with mental disabilities.67
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At the Working Group meeting, WNUSP (the sole accredited NGO representing the mental
health consumer/survivor perspective) questioned the necessity of distinguishing between direct and
indirect discrimination as advocated by the EU. It argued that such a distinction creates a sort of
“loophole” for discrimination to exist and pointed out that CEDAW and CERD are silent on this issue. In
other words, while a provision or policy that directly targets a historically disadvantaged group is not
justifiable, specifying indirect discrimination necessarily leaves open the possibility that employers,
service providers etc. will be able to establish a defense or justification for the discrimination.68 As per
WNUSP, this could pose a real danger for mental health consumer/survivors. Though not explicitly
stated at the Working Group, the idea is that this “loophole” could be used, for example, to justify forced
psychiatric hospitalization.
This position was echoed by Canada, though for reasons unrelated to mental disability. In the
1999 case of British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Comm.) v. B.C.G.S.E.U.
(“Meiorin”),69 the Supreme Court of Canada restructured the analytical approach to be applied in all
discrimination cases. The Court noted that the distinction between direct and indirect, or “adverse
effects,” discrimination was artificial, as most discrimination does not fit into such neat and well-defined
categories. Given that the threshold distinction was difficult to establish, it was seen as problematic that
divergent results flowed from the way the discrimination was characterized. The Court also pointed out
that judges might purposely classify a rule as direct discrimination or adverse effect discrimination

[They] are often denied opportunities to receive an education, to work, or to enjoy the benefits of
public services or other accommodations… In some countries, people with mental disabilities are
subject to de jure discrimination - the arbitrary denial of rights that are afforded to all other
citizens. Improper discrimination may also take place against people with no disability at all - if
they are improperly viewed as having a mental disorder, or if they once experienced a mental
disorder earlier in life.
68
The EU presented this simple, but instructive, example: if a state agency were to mandate that individuals pass a
sight test before obtaining a driver’s license, this might be neutral on its face (in other words, not direct
discrimination), but have the indirect effect of discriminating against those who are visually impaired. However, the
state should have the ability to argue that this restriction is necessary. The resulting text in the Working Group Draft
reads as follows: “Discrimination does not include a provision, criterion or practice that is objectively and
demonstrably justified by the State Party by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are reasonable and
necessary.” See Working Group Draft, supra note 62 (Art. 7(3)).
69
British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Comm.) v. B.C.G.S.E.U. [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
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depending on whether they preferred to see the rule preserved or struck down. In recognition of these
issues, the Court decided to bring the two analytical approaches together such that the distinction between
direct discrimination and adverse effects was irrelevant.70
The problem with this approach is two-fold. First, whereas a defense to discrimination was
previously only available with respect to indirect discrimination, with this reformulation, the duty to
accommodate to the point of undue hardship is made a key element of any defense to a claim of
discrimination (in other words, even in situations respecting direct discrimination). More importantly,
Meiorin was situated within the context of discrimination based on sex. It is arguable that unlike other
forms of discrimination, discrimination in the context of disability is rarely overt, but rather is embedded
in cultures that do not accommodate disability.71 Thus, the utility of indirect discrimination is that it
permits challenges to more covert forms of discrimination. While it is true that this leaves open the
ability for a defense to indirect discrimination, this defense should be tightly circumscribed and should
only become “live” after all efforts have been made to reasonably accommodate the difference of
disability.
Perhaps the more interesting question, however, is the link between reasonable accommodation
and disability. The duty of state parties to reasonably accommodate those with disabilities became one of
the most debated and important aspects of the Working Group session. Without doubt, key ground was
made. In the sub-group established by New Zealand Ambassador Don McKay (who acted as Coordinator
of the Working Group) there was agreement among delegations on the need for a concept such as
reasonable accommodation in the proposed Convention in order to secure compliance with the principle
of non-discrimination. There was also widespread agreement on the need to keep the notion both general
and flexible in order to ensure that it could be readily adapted to different sectors (e.g., employment,
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1 CAN. LAB. L.J. 1 (1993).
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See Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 10, at 472 – 473: “In many cases, the laws do not actively discriminate
against people with mental disabilities, but they may place improper or unnecessary barriers or burdens on
individuals with mental disabilities.”
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education, etc.) and in order to respect the diversity of legal traditions. Further, there was general
agreement that the process of determining what amounts to a reasonable accommodation should be both
individualized (in the sense that it should consciously address the individual’s specific need for
accommodation) and interactive as between the individual and the relevant entity concerned. It was also
understood that the availability of state funding should limit the use of ‘disproportionate burden’ as a
reason by employers and service providers not to provide reasonable accommodation.
However, there was strong disagreement over whether a failure to reasonably accommodate
should itself constitute discrimination. Most notably, Ireland (which has presidency of, and thus
represented, the EU), contrary to the Bangkok Recommendations and the Chair’s Draft, was of the view
that it would be out of place in a Convention such as the one proposed to dictate the manner by which the
concept of reasonable accommodation should be achieved or framed under relevant domestic legislation.
Contrary to this position, the link between a failure to reasonably accommodate and discrimination is
what gives efficacy to the principle of non-discrimination and should not be left to the imagination.72 In
that regard, General Comment No. 5 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
interprets reasonable accommodation as a corollary to non-discrimination by specifically containing a
definition of disability that includes a “denial of reasonable accommodation based on disability…”73
States’ Obligations74
In the context of states’ obligations, the Mexico Draft is particularly useful with respect to mental
disabilities. Inter alia, it includes provisions that would “prevent persons with disabilities from being
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subjected to any form of exploitation, abusive, or degrading treatment in hospitals and psychiatric
institutions”75 and would have both private and public psychiatric facilities “painstakingly monitored by
the health authorities in order to ensure that the living conditions of and treatment administered to said
institutions' patients are in keeping with respect for their dignity and human rights.”76 The Mexico Draft
also impressively provides unfettered access for psychiatric patients to their medical records, 77 but should
be reworded so that this access is only provided to patients, not family members, unless patient approval
is first obtained.
(i) The Right To Physical And Psychological Integrity
Perhaps the most pressing issue facing those diagnosed with a mental disability is the right to
physical and psychological integrity. The two most salient aspects of this right involve forced psychiatric
hospitalization and forced treatment. WNUSP has made its position on these issues very clear: “[t]he
right to autonomy of mind and body, to reject unwanted treatments, is…crucial. The right to say "No" is
central to the preservation of mental and bodily integrity.”78 The implication of this position is that the
Convention “should prohibit unwanted medical and related interventions as a form of torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment…[and] prohibit any kind of confinement or internment
based in whole or in part on disability.”79
(ii) Forced Psychiatric Treatment
Certainly WNUSP’s position has traditionally been seen as being on the fringes, and
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undoubtedly, it is the antithesis of the medical model.80 Rosenthal and Sundram have observed that
“[a]ctivists who are fighting for a ban on coercive treatment…may find it impossible to gain political
supportof language of this kind”, 81 and further point to the need to “make practical compromises” in
order to secure widespread ratification.82 The reality of this observation became apparent at the Working
Group meeting, as the EU and states such as Canada, Japan, India and Sierra Leone expressed trepidation
at a blanket prohibition on forced institutionalization and treatment.
In adopting an inflexible bargaining stance at the Working Group meeting, WNUSP missed a key
opportunity to help shape the normative content of broad statements of rights that are more likely to be
accepted by states. This opportunity was invaluable when considering that while the EU and the abovementioned states supported the principle that such deprivations of liberty should not take place without
appropriate legal safeguards, no delegation came to the Working Group with suggestions on what those
safeguards, or the principles underlying them, should be. In an attempt to fill this gap as the Committee
goes deeper into the drafting process, certain recommendations can be made. First, the only acceptable
“practical compromises” would involve a governing principle that limits forced treatment to the rarest of
occasions. The WHO’s “Principles” respecting mental health allude to this by stating that findings of

80
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incapacity to make treatment decisions “will typically be the case occasionally but not systematically”.83
Regard should also be had for the Council of Europe’s concept of “proportionality”, where any protective
measures are required to be proportional to the needs of the individual concerned. In other words, there
should be recognition of varying degrees of capacity. Such protective measures should also alter the
“…rights and freedoms of the person concerned to the minimum extent which is consistent with
achieving the purpose of the intervention.”84 In these rarest of occasions where an individual is found to
lack capacity to consent to treatment, treatment should only be administered with the consent of his/her
legally authorized representative or substitute decision-maker. Further, if the individual expressed any
prior instructions with respect to psychiatric treatment, at a time when he/she was capable, these
previously expressed wishes must be respected.85
Individuals who are to be the subject of forced treatment should be provided with alternatives to
antipsychotic medications. It should not be presumed that chemical treatment modalities represent the
only viable path. Rather, psychological science studies have further “…established conclusively that an
intensive interpersonal intervention…within a “therapeutic community” context – and staffed by
nonmedical, nonprofessional personnel – could substantially reduce the use of [neuroleptic
medications].”86
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Since their introduction to psychiatry in 1952, neuroleptic or “antipsychotic” drugs such as
haloperidol, chlorpromazine, olanzapine, risperidone and clozapine have been prescribed to millions of
individuals diagnosed as suffering from various psychotic disorders. However, studies have concluded
thatthese medications , described as “one of the most behaviorally toxic classes of psychotropic drugs”,
enjoy no more than a 34% net effectiveness rate in terms of their ability to reduce relapse.87 A
remarkable WHO study shows a correlation between low reliance on antipsychotic medication and
recovery. Beginning in 1969, this research identified patients diagnosed with schizophrenia in nine
countries (China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Nigeria, USSR, United Kingdom and the
U.S.) and monitored their progress over the next eight years. The most striking result was that the
patients from the three poorest countries (where doctors did not generally keep the patients on
antipsychotics) did dramatically better than patients in the developed countries (where the majority of
patients were kept on antipsychotics). At the five year mark, while more than 75 percent of patients in the
three developing countries were either without symptoms or at least functioning fairly well, only 35
percent of the patients in the developed countries enjoyed a similar level of success.88
The distressing side-effects of neuroleptic medications were discussed by the Honourable Mr.
Justice Robins in the Canadian case of Fleming v. Reid:
[T]he efficacy of the drugs is complicated by a number of serious side effects which are
associated with their use. These include a number of muscular side effects known as
extra-pyramidal reactions: dystonia (muscle spasms, particularly in the face and arms,
irregular flexing, writhing or grimacing and protrusion of the tongue); akathesia (internal
restlessness or agitation, an inability to sit still); akinesia (physical immobility and lack of
spontaneity); and Parkinsonisms (mask-like facial expression, drooling, muscle stiffness,
tremors, shuffling gait). The drugs can also cause a number of non-muscular side effects,
such as blurred vision, dry mouth and throat, weight gain, dizziness, fainting, depression,
low blood pressure and, less frequently, cardiovascular changes and, on occasion, sudden
death.

87

Id. at 173 - 174, 192, 201-202.
J. Leff, The International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia: Five-Year Follow-Up Findings 22 PSYCHOLOGICAL
MED. 131 (1992); ROBERT WHITAKER, MAD IN AMERICA: BAD SCIENCE, BAD MEDICINE, AND THE
ENDURING MISTREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL 227-228 (2002). Whitaker, at 228-229, observes that
this study was simply dismissed by Western psychiatrists and went unexplored given that it was “so threatening to
Western medicine”.
88

26
The most potentially serious side effect of anti-psychotic drugs is a condition known as
tardive dyskinesia. This is a generally irreversible neurological disorder characterized by
involuntary, rhythmic and grotesque movement of the face, mouth, tongue, and jaw. The
patient's extremities, neck, back and torso can also become involved. Tardive dyskinesia
generally develops after prolonged use of the drugs, but it may appear after short term
treatment and sometimes appears even after treatment has been discontinued.89

After surveying the scientific literature, the United States Supreme Court in Washington v.
Harper acknowledged that between 10 and 25 percent of all patients treated with antipsychotic
medications display the symptoms of tardive dyskinesia.90 Further, the notion that newer neuroleptic
medications possess therapeutic advantages over older medications is by no means undisputed. Rather, it
has been argued that there is no clear advantage to newer neuroleptic medications and that any perceived
advantage is solely attributable to the fact that newer medications are less potent.91 Last, beyond the
physiological repercussions, forced treatment with antipsychotic medications can have a more nuanced
effect on the sense of self of persons diagnosed with mental disabilities:

A particular treatment decision may be contrary to deeply held social, medical, political
or religious values of a person with a mental disability. Coerced treatment may violate an
individual's sense of control over his or her life, health, and body. When professionals
override a person's decisions about health care, treatment or services, this may strip a
person of a sense that he or she is respected by medical or other public authorities. Once
a person has been subjected to involuntary treatment in a mental health facility, he or she
may never again feel safe or trusting of mental health or other government services. A
person who is going through a period of great mental anguish and need may be
particularly sensitive to feelings of this kind. While it may be hard to quantify the
subjective feelings of humiliation and degradation caused by coercive treatment, there is
no doubt that these feelings may be very intense.92
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(iii) Forced Psychiatric Hospitalization
The proposed Convention should also limit forced psychiatric confinement to the rare situations
where it can be clearly established that the individual, as a result of a mental disability, is either at risk of
serious bodily harm to her/himself or others. However, given that these rationales for commitment are
often inaccurately applied and not adhered to, I advocate language that is in harmony with Article 5(4) of
the European Convention on Human Rights, which states that “Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be
decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”93 This sort of provision
is particularly meaningful given that psychiatric review boards often deny those diagnosed with mental
disabilities the benefit of procedural protections,94 thus falling victim to the medical model assertion that
these safeguards “…can work against the best interests of patients”95 and that “…no benefit, to the
patient, can be expected to result from challenging the validity of [an involuntary committal] certificate
on a technicality.”96 Further, it is essential that a physician’s determination of “dangerousness” leading to
a forced psychiatric admission should not result in the automatic finding that an individual is also
incapable of consenting to treatment or managing finances, and thus an accompanying loss of further
rights.97

93

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221.
94
In general, mental health jurisprudence has not evolved in a manner that affords the same level of procedural
protection to individuals in the criminal justice systems. As argued by one commentator in the Canadian context:
“…courts have been overly reliant on a paternalistic model of mental health law and that such reliance has led to the
under-development of procedural protections for individuals facing involuntary commitment.” See I. Grant, Mental
Health Law and the Courts, 29 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 747, 749 (1991).
95
J.E. Gray, R.L. O’Reilly & G.W. Clements, Protecting the Rights of People with Mental Disabilities: Can we
Achieve both Good Legal Process and Good Clinical Outcomes?, 23:2 HEALTH L. IN CANADA 25, 26 (2002).
96
Id. at 30. For a refutation of this position, see Aaron A. Dhir, The Maelstrom of Civil Commitment in Ontario:
Using Examinations Conducted During Periods of Unlawful Detention to Form the Basis of Subsequent Involuntary
Detention under Ontario’s Mental Health Act, 24:2 HEALTH L. IN CANADA (2003).
97
For example, in the Canadian province of British Columbia, treatment is “deemed to be given with the consent of
the patient” held involuntarily in a psychiatric facility. See Mental Health Act, R.S.B.C. c. 288, s. 31(1) (1996).

28
(iv) Justiciability and Monitoring
The liberty interests at stake under the right to bodily and psychological integrity underscore the
need for clear provisions on justiciability98 and a strong monitoring mechanism. With respect to the
former, the strongest statement currently exists in the ICCPR, which requires states to “develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy”.99 With regard to the Disability Rights Convention, stronger wording is
preferable: “[t]he rights guaranteed by the convention must give rise to enforceable remedies in national
tribunals, and states must also accept an obligation to protect against violation of rights by nongovernmental agents.”100 This position was echoed by the Bangkok Recommendations, which state that
“[t]here should be enforcement mechanisms, including provision of remedies, within institutional and/or
judicial systems.”101
The Working Group did not have time to address the issue of an international monitoring
mechanism for the potential Convention, which will thus be left for the Committee. The type of
mechanism which might be established should not only satisfy the desire to have strong follow-up, but
also meet the concern of avoiding the counter-productive repetition of existing mechanisms (given that
states will undoubtedly argue that further treaty obligations will create an unfair and unmanageable
burden and that a Convention that overlaps with existing instruments will create confusion for states with
respect to their obligations).
The proposed Convention will be the first to be negotiated after the current UN reform initiatives
respecting treaty monitoring began.102 These reforms will consider, inter alia, the concept of a “core

98

“[W]hether the courts can…provide a remedy for aggrieved individuals claiming a violation of those rights”.
Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS, 275 (2nd ed. 2000).
99
ICCPR, supra note 18 (Art. 2(3)(b)).
100
WNUSP SUBMISSION, supra note 58. In British Columbia, instead of being afforded the right to challenge the
“deemed consent” (referred to in footnote 97) before a court or tribunal, the patient is given only the opportunity to
“request a second medical opinion on the appropriateness of the treatment authorized”. It is notable that the second
opinion relates only to the appropriateness of the treatment, not the administration of treatment itself. See Mental
Health Act, R.S.O. c. M.7, s. 31(2) (1990).
101
BANGKOK RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 63.
102
Set against the backdrop of these reforms, it is possible that the eventual final text could be three to four years
away.

29
expanded document”, whereby states would be required to submit one comprehensive report that speaks
to the state’s core obligations under all relevant human rights treaties. Though the single-report
suggestion will likely be resisted by most states (preferring instead a more fragmented approach) and
Committee members themselves (who have a vested interested in maintaining the status quo), this
initiative should be regarded as a positive step in human rights monitoring as it would result in the public
placing a heightened level of importance on the report, forcing states to take such reports more seriously.
International instruments currently contain two primary mechanisms to monitor government
compliance: state reporting and individual complaints. In the event that the idea of a “core expanded
document” does not find favor, one alternative to the present treaty monitoring body system would be to
set-up an Ombudsperson’s office to receive and investigate complaints arising from the Convention.103
Indeed, if we view human rights monitoring broadly, to include “…observing events, visiting sites and
holding discussions with government authorities to obtain information and to pursue remedies”,104
arguably, an Ombudsperson is in a much better position to fulfill these tasks than a treaty-based
committee. With respect to economic, social and cultural rights, an Ombudsperson’s office could also
undertake budget analysis and track statistics in order to monitor state compliance.105 However, even
with an Ombudsperson, there would be reason to remain skeptical given that generally “their remedial
powers are usually recommendatory rather than binding, and their ability to effect compliance rests
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primarily on the publicity of their reports, rather than on formal prosecutorial competences.”106 For
example, while the “Swedish Disability Ombudsman” has the power to receive, examine and investigate
reports from persons alleging that they have been excluded or discriminated against on the grounds of
disability, with respect to ensuring compliance, he is particularly impotent: “[He] may contact other
authorities, businesses or organisations in order to achieve an improvement for people with disability. If
the matter involves inadequacies in current legislation…[he] can draw the attention of the Government to
this.”107 Thus, it is perhaps best to conceive of the Ombudsperson as working alongside the committee
structure, rather than acting as a substitute.
Most radical, however, is the draft Convention produced by Professor Scheinin of Åbo Akademi
University’s Institute for Human Rights (Finland). Scheinin’s draft omits any mention of a new
committee for the proposed Convention. Instead, it proposes a disability Ombudsperson who would
represent claimants in submitting communications under the existing treaties that allow for petitions (i.e.
CERD, ICCPR and CEDAW).108 This is a fascinating suggestion that is worthy of consideration during
the Committee’s deliberations. Indeed, the position of this paper is that existing Convention-based rights
have direct relevance to those diagnosed with disabilities, but that oversight bodies systemically ignore
disability-related issues. The establishment of an Ombudsperson to represent claimants has the potential
of remedying this problem, while at the same time helping to avoid the counter-productive repetition of
existing mechanisms.
If a more traditional committee structure is established, it must be part of a strong monitoring
framework “to gauge the levels of implementation and provide guidance on best practices. This
monitoring mechanism should be empowered to engage all relevant levels, including states,
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intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and individuals.”109 The monitoring
body should be empowered not only to accept and evaluate mandatory reports, but also to hear complaint
petitions from individuals and NGOs and conduct its own investigations into alleged breaches of the
Convention. Admittedly, and in harmony with my comments above respecting the need to remain
mindful of the relationship between the ideal and the real, the establishment of a right to petition may
have to come in the form of an Optional Protocol, especially given that the proposed Convention will
include not only civil and political rights, but economic and social rights as well.110 Perhaps even more
important than providing a sort of mechanism by which to seek a “remedy”, a complaint procedure would
hopefully result in a line of jurisprudence from the oversight committee that would provide a coherent set
of principles which would inform the interpretation of the proposed Convention. Last, it is essential that
the committee assigned the monitoring role be composed of human rights experts,111 and include those
with disabilities. In this regard, article 7 of the Kallehauge Draft reads as follows:
.…there shall be established a Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
which shall carry out the function hereinafter provided.
The Committee shall consist of 12 disability experts of high moral standing and
recognised competence. The members of the committee shall be elected by the States
Parties from among their most prominent national leaders of organisations of disabled
persons, scholars and scientists and shall serve in their personal capacity, consideration
being given to gender and equitable geographical distribution as well as to various kinds
of impairment.112
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VI.

Conclusion
Though there are detailed international human rights mechanisms that are applicable to persons

with mental disabilities, in practice these persons face major impediments to protections respecting the
sanctity of bodily and psychic integrity. They are subjected to discrimination and degrading abuses of
their rights on a daily basis.
A disability-specific Convention would serve to fill a glaring omission in the international
framework, in addition to providing beneficial effects via the very treaty-making process itself. However,
in order to reach its full potential, any such Convention must reject the traditional medical-model of
disability and adopt a reformulation of disability as a social construct, thus reflecting a rights-based
paradigm. While the social theory of disability has been widely accepted in respect of other forms of
disability, the medical-model still governs mental disability. While the complete prohibition on forced
treatment and committal advocated by particular NGOs is unrealistic, certain provisions/principles will
ensure that the proposed Convention promotes a rights-based model. Namely, forced treatment
interventions should be limited to the rarest of occasions and incapacity findings should recognize varying
degrees of capacity. Previously expressed wishes regarding treatment must be respected and individuals
who are the subject of forced treatment should be provided with alternatives to antipsychotic medications.
It should not be presumed that chemical treatment modalities represent the only viable path.
The proposed Convention should also limit forced psychiatric confinement to the rare situations
where it can be clearly established that the individual, as a result of a mental disability, is either at risk of
serious bodily harm to her/himself or others. Individuals subjected to such detention should have the
right to administrative or judicial review in a timely manner. Further, a physician’s determination of

Canada, the Consent and Capacity Board (“the Board”) typically sits as a panel of three (one lawyer member, one
psychiatrist member and one lay member). There is no requirement that persons with disabilities be represented.
While some may argue that the composition of an administrative review tribunal should reflect the principle of
neutrality, the presence of a psychiatrist member demonstrates that the Board should also reflect a degree of
expertise. Indeed, the expertise of the Board is a factor that courts rely on in giving deference to Board decisions on
appeal. See I.T. v.L.L. (a.k.a. C.) and T.C . (1999) 46 O.R. (3d) 284 (Ont. C.A.). It should also be noted that while
lawyer members of the Board are permitted to sit alone, there is no statutory requirement that they have experience
before the Board prior to their appointments, or that they practice in the fields of administrative law or any form of
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“dangerousness” leading to a forced psychiatric admission should not result in the automatic finding that
an individual is also incapable of consenting to treatment or managing finances, and thus an
accompanying loss of further rights. These key provisions, and this article’s recommendations respecting
monitoring and the link between the failure to reasonably accommodate and discrimination, should not be
sacrificed by drafters, lest any future Convention be rendered a hollow mechanism that serves only to
perpetuate the problems it seeks to ameliorate.

litigation. Thus, lawyer members sitting alone need not have any experience or training in tribunal procedure or
evidence. See Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. c. 2, Sch. A, ss. 73(2) (1996).

